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AbstrAct: The analysis of the prosecutorial inquiry in Italian criminal 
proceedings displays a complex scenario. In spite of the progressive 
enhancement of participatory rights of private parties, the overwhel-
ming role of the investigative authorities does not set the necessary 
conditions for effective equality of arms, while largely frustrating the 
tasks of the judiciary. To a great extent, the maintenance of several 
decision-making and coercive powers of the public prosecutor still 
largely reflect the old conception of an independent body of justice. 
Even though the individuals involved in the prosecutorial inquiry are 
ensured participation in a number of police and prosecutorial investiga-
tions, legal assistance often lacks effectiveness, and the possibilities of 
defence lawyers conducting autonomous investigations are scant and 
only achieve a formal level of par condicio. Certainly, this set-up cannot 
be justified in a human rights-oriented model of criminal justice. De 
lege ferenda, the enhancement of the tasks of competent judge for the 
pre-trial inquiry, who under Italian law is not an investigative magistrate 
but is called upon to ensure the proper fulfilment of procedural safe-
guards, appears to constitute today the best alternative to one-sided 
investigations and the dominant role of the investigative authorities.  
1 Professor associado de direito processual penal italiano e justiça penal europeia 
na Universidade de Messina/Itália. Doutor em Direito pela Scuola Superiore 
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resumo: A análise da investigação pelo Ministério Público no processo penal 
italiano apresenta um cenário complexo. Apesar do aumento progressivo 
dos direitos de participação das partes, o papel imenso das autoridades 
investigativas não determina as condições para a efetividade da paridade 
de armas, e também prejudica amplamente as tarefas do julgador. Em 
grande medida, a conservação de vários poderes decisórios e coercitivos do 
Ministério Público ainda refletem a antiga concepção de um independente 
membro de Justiça. Ainda que os indivíduos envolvidos na investigação 
ministerial possam participar em alguns atos policiais e do Ministério Público, 
a defesa técnica em muitas vezes carece de efetividade, e as possibilidades de 
investigações autônomas por advogados de defesa são limitadas e somente 
determinam uma igualdade em nível formal. Certamente, esse cenário não 
pode ser justificado em um modelo de justiça criminal orientado por direitos 
humanos. De lege ferenda, o aumento das tarefas do juiz competente para 
a investigação preliminar, que sistema italiano de justiça penal não é um juiz 
instrutor, mas um juiz de garantias, mostra-se atualmente como a melhor 
alternativa em relação a investigações unilaterais e o papel dominante de 
autoridades investigativas.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: Paridade de armas; imparcialidade judicial; investigação 
preliminar; justiça criminal italiana.
1. IntroductIon 
Italian criminal justice has long been characterised by the strong 
tendency to bring forward the ascertainment of facts prior to the trial 
phase. Under the 1930 code of criminal procedure (the so-called ‘Rocco 
code’), fact-finding was largely based on the information gathered by the 
competent bodies for the pre-trial stages. In particular, the intermediate 
stage (istruzione), headed either by an investigating magistrate or the 
public prosecutor,2 primarily aimed at the collection of evidence for the 
2 Investigative judges headed a formal inquiry (istruzione formale), whereas 
prosecutors an interim one (istruzione sommaria). 
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purposes of the trial decisions.3 This set-up had considerable repercus-
sions on a number of fundamental rights of the individuals involved in 
criminal proceedings. Not only had private parties very limited room in 
the prosecutorial inquiries and the evidence-gathering activities con-
ducted by the investigative magistrate, but furthermore the accused was 
normally remanded into custody after the institution of istruzione, being 
therefore deprived of the right to take part in criminal proceedings as a 
free person.4 The inevitable imbalance between the defendant and the 
competent authority for evidence gathering at the pre-trial stages was 
further aggravated in the trial, on two main grounds. Firstly, the trial 
judges could make full use of the information collected by investigative 
bodies and law enforcement authorities. Secondly, the defence could 
only give indirect contribution to the taking of oral evidence in open 
court, since depending on the types of the proceedings, witnesses were 
examined by either the president of the trial court or by a district court 
judge (pretore).5 
Since the beginning of the 1960s, legal scholarship strongly criti-
cised this criminal justice system, particularly the prosecutorial inquiry, 
which, though initially conceived as an exception to the ordinary judicial 
inquiry, soon gained ground in practice. There was little doubt that this 
set-up turned out to frustrate both the possibility of impartial fact-finding 
and the accused’s right to be heard by an independent body.6 Constitutional 
case-law also played an important role in the enhancement of defence 
rights in the pre-trial phases. However, this model was long tolerated on 
several grounds, mainly because the public prosecutor, forming part of 
the judiciary, is under Italian law an independent body of justice (organo 
3 Siracusano. Istruzione del processo penale, pp. 166 ff.
4 The inclusion of the rules on both arrest and remand detention into the sys-
tematic structure of the 1930 code at the beginning of the Book concerned 
with the intermediate phase was clearly in line with the typically inquisitorial 
appreciation of pre-trial custody as the most appropriate means of forcefully 
achieving the collaboration (if not the confession) of the defendant, who was 
also viewed as an instrument for the success of the criminal inquiries rather 
than a right holder. Cf. Marzaduri. Misure cautelari personali, p. 61. 
5 Art. 440 of the 1930 code.
6 For strong criticisms see, in particular, Cordero. Ideologie del processo penale, 
pp. 3 ff.
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di giustizia).7 Yet it was difficult to understand how fact-finding could be 
deemed truly independent, if the same authority that charged defendants 
with a criminal offence and remanded them into custody was also empo-
wered to collect incriminating evidence against them. Similar concerns 
could be raised in relation to the istruzione headed by the investigative 
magistrate, who not only had considerable coercive powers, but could 
also autonomously initiate a criminal prosecution in cases of rejection of 
the prosecutor’s request for discontinuance of the proceedings.
It took more than two more decades, however, before Italian 
lawmakers reformed this legislative set-up. The strong adversarial ins-
piration of the 1988 codification8 (the so-called ‘Vassalli code’) led the 
Italian legislature to depart from the previous model of pre-trial inquiries. 
The public prosecutorial office was deprived of some coercive powers, as 
pre-trial detention and further restrictions on freedom could only ordered 
by a judge. Moreover, both the police and the prosecutor could no longer 
gather evidence with a view to a guilty verdict. Thus, pursuant to a new 
general exclusionary rule, the trial judges were precluded access to the 
information collected in the pre-trial stages, which was not to be included 
into the trial file but into the prosecutorial file that was not at the disposal 
of the decision-makers.9 Along with the reduction of the law enforcement 
and evidence-gathering powers of the prosecutorial authority, the 1988 
code abolished the old investigative magistrate, replaced through a new 
judicial body, namely a competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry (giudice 
per le indagini preliminari). Unlike the investigative magistrate, this judge 
was intended to be an independent authority with the main task of en-
suring respect for procedural safeguards in the pre-trial stages, without 
any power to indict the accused and to gather evidence on his own.10 
7 See Art. 73 of Royal Decree 12/1941 (statute on the organisation of the ju-
diciary). Critical remarks on this concept were formulated by Chiavario. Il 
pubblico ministero organo di giustizia?, pp. 714 ff.
8 Article 2(1) of the Delegation Law for the new code of criminal procedure 
(Law 81/1987) contained an explicit reference to the requirement that the 
drafters of the new codification fulfil the principles of an adversarial model 
of criminal justice.     
9 See Arts. 431 and 433 CCP.
10 On this new judge see the comprehensive analysis of Ruggieri. La giurisdizio-
ne di garanzia nelle indagini preliminari. 
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A look at the developments that have taken place over almost 
three decades, however, reveals the enormous difficulties that both Italian 
courts and the lawmakers encountered to avoid a dangerous return to the 
mixed system of inquisitorial tradition, while fulfilling the new challenges 
posed by the case-law of the Strasbourg Court of human rights,11 as well as 
by EU law. This study examines the milestones in the evolution of Italian 
criminal justice over recent years. While highlighting the steps forward 
made by the current codification, I shall also analyse the shortcomings 
of the original model of a prosecutorial inquiry headed by an impartial 
body of justice, as well as the subsequent developments that occurred in 
both legislation and case-law, which have deeply altered the trade-offs 
of the prosecutorial investigation. To this end, I shall firstly examine a 
preliminary issue, namely whether and to what extent the par condicio 
principle and the right to be tried before an independent tribunal apply 
to pre-trial phases in criminal proceedings.
2.  the guarantee of an ImpartIal judge, the prIncIple of 
contradictoire and the equalIty of arms In the pre-trIal 
InquIry under the european conventIon and In the 
constItutIonal model of a faIr trIal
Whereas international human rights law and the constitutional 
law of several European countries generally acknowledge the right to be 
tried before an independent and impartial court in criminal matters, the 
principle of equality of arms is not widely recognised with specific regard 
to criminal proceedings. The Pact of San José is quite unique among other 
international human rights charters, in that it expressly grants the person 
charged with a criminal offence a set of minimum due process safeguards 
“with full equality”.12 The European Convention on Human Rights, instead, 
11 The aforementioned Article 2(1) of Law 81/1987 also required the drafters 
of the new code to comply with the provisions set forth by the international 
conventions ratified by Italy, regarding the rights of the individuals involved 
in criminal proceedings, a requirement that explicitly aimed at orienting the 
current codification towards the standards of protection acknowledged by 
the European Convention and further developed by Strasbourg case-law. 
12 Art. 8(2) ACHR.
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does not explicitly enshrine the principle of par condicio in criminal 
matters. There is little doubt, however, that the fundamental guarantee 
of equal treatment is of the utmost relevance in the model of a fair trial 
under the Rome Convention. The case-law of the Strasbourg Court has 
confirmed this assumption on various occasions by recognising that “the 
right to an adversarial process, as required by Article 6 of the Convention, 
means that both the prosecution and to the defense must be given the 
opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed 
and the evidence adduced by the other party”.13 On close examination, 
this conclusion does not contradict the spirit of the Convention, which, 
although not enabling prosecutors to claim state-related interests before 
the Strasbourg institutions,14 does not ensure defendants the right to be 
heard fairly but to an overall fair hearing. In more recent times, European 
case-law has further developed a wide-ranging understanding of criminal 
proceedings. By departing from the accused-centred view of criminal 
trials, the Strasbourg judges have increasingly called for complex balan-
ces among conflicting interests, which are not only concerned with the 
public prosecutor and the private parties, but also with other individuals 
involved in criminal proceedings without being party to them, such as 
vulnerable witnesses, undercover agents, and so on.  
The link between the principle of equality of arms and the right 
to be adjudicated by an impartial court, however, cannot be interpreted 
in such terms that this fundamental guarantee should only be fulfilled 
in the court proceedings. A relevant question, therefore, is whether 
and to what extent international human rights law also requires com-
pliance with par condicio in the pre-trial inquiry. The examination of 
the delicate field of the right to confrontation with the accuser displays 
a significant difference in the approaches followed by the Strasbourg 
Court and domestic law. Without a doubt, the enshrinement of the ge-
neral right to a public hearing by the European Convention entails that 
the trial provides the best conditions for the parties contributing to the 
13 ECtHR, Fodale v. Italy, judgment of 1 June 2006, Appl. No. 70148/01, § 42. In 
this sense see already ECtHR, Laukkanen and Manninen v. Finland, judgment 
of 3 February 2004, Appl. No. 50230/99, § 34.
14 In this sense cf. Trechsel. Human rights in criminal proceedings, p. 90. 
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gathering of incriminating evidence.15 Strasbourg case-law, however, 
has never emphasised this approach to the extent that it deemed the 
trial confrontation to be the only solution compatible with the Conven-
tion. As was stressed in Asch v. Austria,16 confrontation in open court 
can be an undesirable result. For instance, in cases of serious organised 
crime, the prompt out-of-court collection of evidence by prosecutorial 
witnesses or co-defendants is usually of the utmost importance both 
for a clear reconstruction of complex situations and in order to avoid 
undue risks for the person examined. The Strasbourg judges have not 
explicitly clarified whether the Convention acknowledges the right to 
confrontation in the pre-trial phase. Yet the positive answer was implicit 
in Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, in which they ruled out a violation of the 
right to confrontation because neither the lawyer nor the defendant had 
asked to be present at the police questioning of a witness.17 Moreover, the 
Court’s usual focus on the requirement that defendants be given a proper 
opportunity of confrontation at a later stage of the proceedings reveals 
a flexible approach, which does not make confrontation in a public trial 
a mandatory solution, provided, however, that the accused was granted 
an effective opportunity of confrontation.18  
The Italian Constitution of 1947 did not provide an explicit ack-
nowledgment of par condicio in court proceedings in general. Yet, along 
with the general principle of equal treatment of Article 3 of the Consti-
tution, there was little doubt that the need for a fair balance of the rights 
and powers of the parties – particularly in the sensitive field of criminal 
proceedings, characterised in Italy by the prevailing role of the public 
prosecution office – was a necessary condition for the proper fulfilment 
of a number of constitutional safeguards, starting with the fundamental 
right to a defence and the presumption of innocence. Constitutional 
Amendment Law 2/1999, while enacting into the Constitution a set of 
15 Ibid., pp. 305 f.
16 ECtHR, Asch v. Austria, judgment of 26 April 1991, Appl. No. 12398/86.  
17 ECtHR, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 November 1993, Appl. No. 
13972/88. In the sense underlined in the text cf. Trechsel, Human rights in 
criminal proceedings, p. 309.
18 ECtHR, Barberá, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, judgment of 6 December 
1988, Appl. No. 10590/83. 
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fair trial rights acknowledged by the European Convention, enshrined 
three basic features of all court proceedings, namely the right to be 
involved in judicial proceedings, the right to an impartial judge and the 
principle of equality of arms. A systematic examination of Article 111(2) 
of the Constitution surely excludes the possibility of interpreting these 
fundamental safeguards as unconnected from each other. It is hard to 
understand how the parties could be fairly heard in criminal proceedings 
without an independent and impartial judicial oversight that ensured full 
equality of arms. The need for systematic interpretation also deemphasized 
the need for a structuralist approach to the principle of contradictoire,19 
which is strictly linked with the other constitutional rules regarding the 
fair trial rights of the accused.20 The effective exercise of the right to 
participate in criminal proceedings, in particular, requires defendants 
to be given proper information on the charges filed against them and to 
have enough time to prepare their defence.21 Furthermore, the accused’s 
right to be confronted with incriminating witnesses22 lies at the core of 
the requirement of the parties’ involvement in evidence-gathering and 
the principles of a fair fact-finding, to the point that defendants cannot 
be convicted on the basis of the statements given by individuals who 
voluntarily avoided any confrontation with the accused.23  
As far as the right to confrontation is concerned, moreover, it is 
worth observing that Italian constitutional law departs from Strasbourg 
case-law by recognising the right to examine or have examined incrimi-
nating witnesses ‘before a judge’. This provision, however, cannot be read 
in the sense that only confrontation in open court would be lawful for the 
purposes of decision-making, as Italian law provides a number of cases 
19 Marzaduri. Commento all’art. 1 legge costituzionale 2/1999, p. 767.
20 The term ‘accused’ (accusato) is traditionally extraneous to Italian criminal 
procedural law, which usually relates to the person formally charged with a 
criminal offence as ‘defendant’ (imputato). Over recent years, however, the 
rising influence of international human rights law and EU law has led to the 
gradual spread of this new concept in Italian law. This poses unprecedented 
problems of compatibility with the national terminology, which in turn entails 
substantial implications on the scope of application of fundamental guarantees. 
21 Art. 111(3) Const.
22 Ibid.
23 Art. 111(4) Const.
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in which the trial decision can (also) be based on evidence taken out of 
court. Thus, along with specific exceptions that can be justified in light 
of constitutional-law derogations from the principle of contradictoire,24 
the Vassalli code allows the reading out of statements rendered by the 
accused in the pre-trial stages to the public prosecutor or the police acting 
upon delegation, statements that, even if inconsistent with the evidence 
given at trial, can be used against the defendant.25 On close examination, 
it is more than doubtful that such solutions are fully in line with the 
constitutional model of a fair trial. At any rate, the possibility of using 
evidence gathered by the investigative authorities out of court poses the 
delicate question of which safeguards are due to the person examined in 
light of the principle of equality of arms in the pre-trial stages, a ques-
tion that does not only concern the questioning of suspects but also the 
prosecutorial or police hearing of other individuals, such as the victim, 
co-accused, vulnerable witnesses, and so on. 
Certainly, the complex structure of criminal proceedings makes it 
by definition impossible for the public prosecution office and the private 
parties to be placed on an equal footing. Great differences exist between 
the public prosecutor and the defence. Even though prosecutors hold a 
number of rights in the manner of private parties, they can never have 
a private interest in fact-finding. Moreover, that the public prosecutor is 
called upon to carry out exhaustive investigations, collecting evidence 
both against and in favour of the suspect,26 still justifies the maintenance 
of coercive and decision-making powers which lie with the judiciary. 
This in turn poses the need to re-balance the relationship with private 
parties, particularly in the pre-trial inquiry. 
It was surely not the intention of the drafters of the 1999 cons-
titutional reform to disrupt this set-up by imposing a perfect equality 
of arms. Yet the enactment of the par condicio principle and the right to 
contradictoire in the same general provision on the essential requirements 
of all fair trials calls for a stronger relationship between these two funda-
mental guarantees than in the past. The achievement of a real equality of 
24 Art. 111(5) Const. 
25 Art. 503(5) CCP.
26 Arts. 326 and 358 CCP.
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arms does not only enable effective contradictoire among the parties, but 
should also require the enhancement of an independent oversight and 
the role of the judiciary in the pre-trial stages.27 This confirms that under 
Italian constitutional law too, the scope of the par condicio principle and 
the right to contradictoire cannot be circumscribed to court proceedings. 
One might argue that the principle of equality of arms should be recog-
nized in an indirect manner in the preliminary phase, in that denial of 
defence rights would negatively affect the effective exercise of the right to 
contradictoire on an equal position at a later stage of the proceedings.28 Yet 
this explication would leave the defence unprotected in the prosecutorial 
and police inquiry, in which the imbalance between the law enforcement 
authorities and private parties reaches its highest tension.
The examination of the developments that have occurred over al-
most twenty years since the 1999 constitutional fair trial reform highlights 
the difficulties that the Italian criminal justice had to face to fulfil the 
constitutional principle of equality of arms and the right to an indepen-
dent and impartial judge. In the following paragraphs, I shall examine 
the fragmentary evolution of Italian law, which not only reveals the 
inability of Italian legislation to depart from a somewhat paternalistic 
understanding of defence rights in the pre-trial inquiry, but also the 
inconsistencies that still characterise the role of the competent judge for 
procedural safeguards in this delicate phase.
3.  the InItIatIon of the pre-trIal InquIry, InformatIon 
rIghts and the need for Independent oversIght of the 
prosecutorIal InvestIgatIons
The initiation of the pre-trial inquiry poses a number of difficult 
challenges from the viewpoint of a balanced distribution of powers. 
Notwithstanding that Italian procedural law, differently from that of 
other countries (e.g., Brazil), structures the preliminary investigations 
as a prosecutorial inquiry, the preliminary investigation has never lain 
27 Marzaduri. Commento all’art. 1 legge costituzionale 2/1999, pp. 768 f.
28 Ibid., p. 769.
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with the responsibility of the sole public prosecutor. To be sure, the 1988 
code conceived of a centralised model of pre-trial inquiry, which started 
with the registration of notitia criminis by the competent prosecutor and 
allowed the police to investigate only by delegation, after prosecutors took 
over the leadership of the case.29 Nevertheless, under the original rules, 
the police could already gather notitiae criminis at their own initiative,30 
and both the prosecutor and the police were empowered to conduct all 
the necessary investigations to enable the former to decide whether or 
not to indict defendants before the competent court.31 This centralised 
model of pre-trial inquiry, however, soon imploded on itself. A few years 
after the code’s enactment, the 1992 antimafia legislative reform allowed 
the police to carry out autonomous investigations,32 which significantly 
altered the overall features of the pre-trial phase, enabling the police to 
conduct parallel inquiries to those headed by the competent prosecutor. 
Despite these radical changes, the responsibility for the institu-
tion of the pre-trial inquiry is still generally in the hands of the public 
prosecutorial office,33 which raises several problems particularly in light 
of the European Convention and EU law. A first problem concerns the 
absence of a clear statutory deadline for the registration of notitia criminis, 
as Italian law only requires the public prosecutor to note the case ‘imme-
diately’. Although there is no independent oversight, eventual delays can, 
however, not jeopardise the person under investigation who, despite not 
having assumed the formal status of a ‘suspect’, cannot be questioned 
without the safeguards due to suspects.34 Yet the prosecutorial initiative 
of noting the alleged offence entails a number of relevant implications, 
starting with the information rights of the individuals concerned. To be 
sure, the annotation of the case does not in itself constitute a ‘charge’ in 
29 Art. 348(1) CCP (1988 version). 
30 Art. 330.
31 Art. 326 CCP.
32 Law Decree 306/1992, converted into Law 356/1992. 
33 A significant exception is foreseen in the proceedings with fall within the 
competence of the justices of the peace, in which the pre-trial inquiry, as a 
general rule, lies with the responsibility of the police. See Arts 11 et seqq. of 
Legislative Decree 274/2000.
34 Art. 63(2) CCP.
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the terms of the European Convention, which requires the defendant to 
be informed (and to be kept informed) of the ‘accusation’.35 Since the 
obligation to register the alleged offence fulfils the need to establish the 
time of formal initiation of criminal proceedings, the prosecutorial duty 
of annotation arises even if evidence against one or more individuals has 
not yet been collected.36 Moreover, it is apparent that, if the institution 
of a criminal inquiry entailed the duty of the competent authorities to 
immediately inform the individuals that might be involved in the criminal 
law action, this would frustrate the goals of the ongoing investigations. 
Therefore, the rules of Article 335 CCP, which do not require prosecu-
tors starting a criminal investigation to provide information at their own 
initiative, are exempt from criticism. The need for information, however, 
arises when enough evidence is collected against one or more individuals, 
who must therefore be charged with a criminal offence37 by taking on 
the formal status of ‘suspects’.38 
The 1988 code provided for a radical solution in this regard, ex-
cluding any information until the defendant was brought to court.39 It is 
more than doubtful whether this harsh solution could be deemed in line 
with the constitutional-law right to an effective defence.40 It took several 
years, however, before Law 332/1995 acknowledged the right of both 
suspects and victims to receive information on the prosecutorial charge 
and its eventual modifications. Yet this legislative reform had conside-
rable shortcomings, which raised several human rights concerns about 
the consistency of the new regulation with both constitutional law and 
the European Convention. Thus, the system introduced in 1995, which 
is largely still in force, does not require prosecutors to grant information 
ex officio, but only enables the individuals concerned to request infor-
mation to the competent prosecutorial office.41 Furthermore, the public 
35 Art. 6(3)(a) ECHR.
36 Art. 335(1) CCP.
37 Marzaduri. Commento all’art. 1 legge costituzionale 2/1999, p. 782.
38 Art. 335(2) CCP.
39 Art. 335(3) CCP (1988 version). 
40 Art. 24 Const.
41 Art. 335(3) CCP.
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prosecutor could also deny information if this might jeopardise the on-
going inquiry for a period no longer than three months.42 This is a very 
questionable solution, not only because the competent prosecutor can 
withhold the sought information on the ground of vague investigative 
needs, but also because the prosecutorial decision cannot be challenged 
before an independent authority.  
The most difficult problem, however, is the choice of the legal 
classification of the offence, which also lies solely with the prosecutor 
noting the case. Without a doubt, the establishment of nomen juris is 
not a formal decision, but entails a number of delicate human rights 
implications. In particular, the 1995 legislative reform permitted the 
exclusion of information in cases of certain serious offences listed in 
Article 407(2)(a) CCP (kidnapping with the purpose of extortion, ma-
fia-typed organised crime, terrorism, etc.).43 This solution, which is 
still in force despite the recent legislative implementation of Directive 
2012/13/EU on information rights in criminal proceedings,44 provides 
a highly problematic presumptio juris et de jure. Thus, it is debatable that 
the abstract seriousness of the offence always entails risks for the ongoing 
investigation.45 Furthermore, it is clear that restrictions on the right to 
information cannot be justified in relation to the victim and the suspect 
in the same terms, as granting information to the victim does not entail 
similar risks to the ongoing inquiry.46  
Moreover, the choice of nomen juris can have relevant consequen-
ces on the use of several investigative measures that seriously interfere 
with fundamental rights. Under Italian law, for example, wiretaps can only 
be ordered in relation to specific offences (Katalogtaten),47 as classified 
by the competent prosecutor while noting the case. Further implications, 
moreover, derive from the prosecutor’s initial decision in the remand 
42 Art. 335(3-bis) CCP.
43 Art. 335(3) CCP.
44 Legislative Decree 101/2014. 
45 Marzaduri. Commento all’art. 1 legge costituzionale 2/1999, p. 779 fn. 110.
46 A recent legislative reform, however, ensured to the victim the right to re-
quest information on the ongoing inquiry the latest six months after lodging 
a complaint. See Art. 335(3-ter) CCP, enacted by Law 103/2017.
47 Art. 266 CCP.
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proceedings and the procedures regarding other restrictions on free-
dom of the individuals charged with some serious offences (especially 
mafia-type crimes). Thus, the Vassalli code, departing from the general 
understanding of pre-trial detention as extrema ratio, allows defendants 
to be remanded in custody solely on the basis of a suspicion of guilt.48 
This set-up in turn exonerates both the prosecutor to demonstrate and 
the competent judge to ascertain the existence of specific risks for the 
ongoing procedure (risk of absconding, or tampering with evidence, 
or committing new serious crimes). In other words, this solution not 
48 This controversial regulation was introduced by the aforementioned 1992 an-
timafia reform with regard to mafia-related crimes (mafia-type association, 
crimes committed using the typical conditions of mafia-type association and 
crimes of mafia abetting). Over more than two decades, the original rules 
have been amended several times. In 2009, a legislative reform carried out 
by Law-Decree 11/2009, converted into Law 38/2009, extended the scope of 
Article 275(3) CCP to the area of sexual offences and other serious crimes. 
This reform was largely countered by the Constitutional Court, which fur-
ther narrowed the application of this exceptional mechanism. Ultimately, fol-
lowing the approach of constitutional case-law, Law 47/2015 distinguished 
the special rules on remand detention according to two groups of serious 
crimes. In case of the offences under Articles 270, 270-bis and 416-bis of the 
penal code (subversive association, criminal association aimed at national 
and international terrorism and at subverting democratic order, and mafia-
-related criminal association), pre-trial detention is to be applied if suspicion 
of guilt arises, unless it is proven that no risk exists to the ongoing inquiry. 
In relation to other serious crimes (murder, sexual crimes, etc.), the same 
mechanism applies, with the difference, however, that alternatives to custody 
can also be applied in case of attenuated risks to the proceedings. 
 At first glance, it appears that Italian law provides for proper balance among 
conflicting interests, allowing for the application of remand detention on the 
basis of a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness of defendants charged 
with these crimes. However, the code exonerates the judicial authority from 
assessing the real existence of any concrete risk to the ongoing inquiry. Thus, 
as a rule, the defendant must produce evidence in rebuttal. Furthermore, the 
possibility of overturning the presumption of dangerousness depends on 
very exigent proof on the part of the defence. That the assessment of sus-
picion of guilt provides the sole justification of remand detention raises se-
rious human rights concerns especially in the cases of mafia-related criminal 
association and of sexual crimes, in which one can observe the widespread 
tendency of proving fumus delicti on the basis of dangerous inferences and 
presumptions. On the fact-finding in the field of mafia-typed crimes see the 
comprehensive analysis of Maggio. Prova e valutazione giudiziale dei com-
portamenti mafiosi, pp. 491 ff.
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only facilitates the onus probandi of the competent prosecutor, but also 
weakens the requirements of fact-finding, with evident repercussions 
on the right to freedom. 
In sum, the prosecutor’s unchallengeable choice of the legal 
classification of the alleged offence, without any independent oversight, 
can have a considerable influence on the decision-making powers of the 
competent judge. It is true that in the field of pre-trial coercive measures, 
Italian courts widely accept the possibility of the competent court for 
judicial review (riesame) changing the nomen juris chosen by the public 
prosecutor.49 Yet judicial review presupposes the appeal of the interested 
party, and the application of restrictions on freedom is purely accidental. 
De lege ferenda, the competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry should be 
able to scrutinise the appropriateness of the legal classification of the 
offence by the competent prosecutor; a good solution might be to require 
a judicial review of nomen juris at certain intervals. Of course, even such 
solutions would remain rather useless, if the competent judge were still 
precluded access to the prosecutorial file. The logic of non-inquiry, or 
limited inquiry, does not seem to be compatible with the need to ensure 
full protection of procedural safeguards in the investigative phase. There 
is no valid justification for withholding relevant information from the 
judicial authority, which should instead be given full knowledge of the 
evidence collected by the investigative authorities, regardless of whether 
or not access to the materials of the case if allowed to the defence.
4.  Interference wIth fundamental rIghts, prosecutorIal powers 
and the role of the judIcIary In the pre-trIal stages
4.1. Premise
A highly problematic topic from the viewpoint of the present 
discussion concerns the use of coercive measures for the purposes of 
evidence-gathering in the pre-trial stages. The dynamics of the ordering 
of intrusive investigations, in particular, constitute a clear example of the 
49 Negri. Fumus commissi delicti, p. 61.
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persistent inability of Italian legislation to provide a model of pre-trial 
inquiry that can fully satisfy the constitutional-law requirement of equality 
of arms throughout criminal proceedings. For the sake of clarity, I shall 
focus on three main issues, namely a) the increasing decision-making 
powers of the prosecutorial authority in ordering intrusive investigations, 
b) the role of the judiciary in the collection of usable evidence in open 
court, and finally c) participatory safeguards and the impartiality of the 
competent judge in the field of pre-trial detention and further restric-
tions on freedom.
4.2.  The increasing decision-making Powers of The Public ProsecuTorial 
office in ordering coercive measures 
Concerning the first issue, we have observed that the 1988 co-
dification not only abolished the investigative magistrate but also dras-
tically reduced the evidence-gathering tasks of public prosecutors, in 
that the information gathered by the investigative bodies, as a rule, could 
no longer be used in open court. The in-depth reforms carried out by 
the Vassalli code, however, did not suffice to eradicate all the coercive 
powers of prosecutorial authority, which under Italian law, as noted, still 
forms part of the judiciary. To a certain extent, it might be argued that 
the new criminal justice system, despite its strong adversarial approach, 
strengthened the pre-trial inquiry in comparison to the fascist codifica-
tion, while maintaining some important decision-making powers on the 
part of the public prosecutorial office. There was a number of relevant 
examples. As a ‘judicial authority’, the public prosecutorial office was 
empowered to order physical inspections50 and home searches51 in the 
preliminary phase, and also in the exceptional cases in which the police 
could conduct searches without previous judicial authorisation, confir-
mation ought to be requested to the prosecutor.52 The competences of 
the prosecutorial authority were extended even to the area of free and 
secret (tele)communication, notwithstanding that Italian constitutional 
50 Art. 244(2) CCP.
51 Art. 247(2-3) CCP.
52 Art. 352(4) CCP.
575
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 4, n. 2, p. 559-603, mai.-ago. 2018.
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v4i2.161 |
law only allows restrictions on this fundamental right after judicial au-
thorisation.53 Thus the 1988 code, while generally conditioning wiretaps 
on judicial authorisation,54 had already enabled the public prosecutor to 
order the interception of telecommunications in urgent cases, provided, 
however, that the competent judge validate the prosecutorial order.55
The years ahead not only led to the strengthening of the law 
enforcement and investigative powers of the police during the pre-trial 
inquiry, but also of the decision-making powers of the prosecutorial au-
thority. The developments that have taken place in recent years confirm 
how deep the traditional understanding of the public prosecutorial office 
as an independent body of justice is still embedded in Italian criminal 
procedural law. A clear example was provided by Law 85/2009, through 
which Italy adhered to the 2005 Prüm Convention aimed at strengthening 
cross-border cooperation particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border 
crime and illegal migration. This legislation introduced new provisions 
with a view to establishing the conditions of taking specific forms of expert 
evidence requiring delicate medical checks, such as the sampling of hair 
or mucosa from the oral cavity for the purposes of DNA examination.56 
The same legislative reform, moreover, laid down further rules aimed at 
governing the compulsory taking of biological samples in the pre-trial 
inquiry. Here also, as a general principle, judicial authorisation by the 
competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry is necessary in the absence 
of the consent of the interested person.57 Nevertheless, in urgent cases 
the competent prosecutor can order such medical surveys, which are, 
however, subject to subsequent judicial validation within short time-li-
mits.58 The most worrisome case, furthermore, is where the police need 
such intrusive investigations during their autonomous inquiries for the 
purposes of the identity check of the suspect or other individuals who 
do not consent to the coercive sampling. In this case, the police cannot 
53 Art. 15(2) Const.
54 Art. 267(1) CCP-Italy.
55 Art. 267(2) CCP-Italy 
56 Art. 224-bis CCP.
57 Art. 359-bis(1) CCP.
58 Art. 359-bis(2) CCP.
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proceed without the authorisation of the public prosecutorial office,59 
which here is therefore the competent body for ordering investigations 
that can severely affect the fundamental rights of the person subject to 
the expert examination. 
More recently, we have witnessed a further enhancement of 
the prosecutorial decision-making powers in the field of interception of 
telecommunications. It has been noted that the 1988 code had already 
empowered the competent prosecutor to order wiretaps in urgent cases, 
provided that the competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry could vali-
date the prosecutorial decree within short time-limits. Remarkably, the 
requirement of judicial validation is a necessary condition not only for 
continuing the ongoing interception but also for the admissibility of the 
information gathered.60 At the end of 2017, moreover, a wide-ranging 
legislative reform on interception of telecommunication61 enacted into 
the rules on wiretaps unprecedented provisions aimed at governing the 
use of modern eavesdropping devices, such as Trojan horses, to intercept 
private conversations among present people.62 It is noteworthy that in 
the proceedings for a number of serious crimes (criminal organisation, 
drug trafficking, etc.), prosecutors are also competent for ordering such 
intrusive forms of interception of communication in urgent cases, on 
condition that surveillance is validated by the judicial authority.63   
4.3.  In cAmerA Procedures, righT To confronTaTion and The role of The 
comPeTenT judge for The Pre-Trial inquiry in The gaThering of evidence 
for The PurPoses of The Trial decisions 
Further imbalances can be observed in the field of the collection 
of evidence for the purposes of the trial decisions. In this regard also, the 
1988 code, while dropping both the prosecutorial evidence-gathering and 
59 Art. 349(2-bis) CCP.
60 Ibid.
61 Legislative Decree 2016/2017. For in-depth analysis of this reform see among 
others Giostra; Orlandi (coord.). Nuove norme in tema di intercettazioni.
62 Art. 267(1) CCP-Italy. 
63 Art. 267(2-bis) CCP-Italy. 
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the inquiry of an investigating judge, introduced a new judicial procedure 
in camera, aimed at taking evidence in the pre-trial phase with a view to 
the decision on the merits of the case. This procedure, called ‘incidente 
probatorio’, was mainly concerned with urgent evidence, that is, evidence 
that could not possibly be collected in open court.64 Furthermore, incidente 
probatorio did not necessarily pursue the aim of ensuring prosecutorial 
evidence, but also helped compensate suspects for the prevailing role of 
the public prosecutor at the pre-trial stage by granting them a powerful 
tool with a view to ensuring in advance useful information, which was 
to be inserted into the trial file.65 This aim was of the utmost importance 
at that time, mostly because of the lack of specific rules governing the 
carrying out of defence’s investigations. The existence of multiple goals 
pursued by this mechanism was confirmed by the fact that the Vassalli 
code enabled both the prosecutor and the suspect (either personally or 
by means of his lawyer) to request judicial intervention.   
At first glance, this procedure constituted a virtuous example of 
equal treatment of the parties in the new prosecutorial inquiry on several 
grounds. The code not only ensured the taking of evidence before an 
independent body – i.e., the competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry 
– but also required the application in incidente probatorio of the same 
rules governing the trial evidence-gathering.66 This in turn enhanced the 
suspect’s right to confrontation, since, as a matter of principle, the taking 
of evidence could not be extended to issues concerned with individuals 
whose lawyers were not present67 and at trial, the information obtained, 
as a rule, could not be used against individuals not represented in court.68 
These expectations, however, were largely frustrated. The res-
tauration of rather inquisitorial practices by the 1992 antimafia legisla-
tion, while jeopardising the distinction between the prosecutorial and 
64 It should be acknowledged, however, that the 1988 rules already provided for 
an important case of evidence-gathering unconnected from urgent reasons. 
Pursuant to Article 392(2) CCP, complex expert evidence should, as a rule, 
be taken in the pre-trial stage to avoid excessive congestion of the trial phase. 
65 Art. 431(1)(e) CCP.
66 Art. 401(5) CCP.
67 Art. 401(6) CCP.
68 Art. 403 CCP.
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the trial file, strengthened the evidence-gathering powers of the public 
prosecutorial office in the pre-trial phase, which drastically reduced 
the prosecutor’s interest in activating the court procedure of incidente 
probatorio. Moreover, though the 1999 constitutional fair trial reform 
paved the way for the establishment of par condicio also in the preli-
minary investigation, the lawmakers, by way of implementing the new 
constitutional-law principles, did not enhance this judicial procedure, 
but preferred to compensate for the overwhelming role of the public 
prosecutor by introducing a new set of investigative measures that the 
lawyers of private parties can carry out autonomously.69  
On close examination, this procedure in camera has always ensured 
the impartiality of the judiciary and the fundamental right to confronta-
tion to a somewhat formalistic extent. The first difficulties arise for the 
competent judge for the preliminary inquiry, since in the current criminal 
justice system, as noted, the taking of evidence at the pre-trial stages for 
the purposes of the trial decisions no longer falls within the ordinary 
tasks of the judicial authority. It is true that here the competent judge 
is not called upon to take evidence at his own initiative, but the judicial 
oversight of the gathering of evidence requested by the parties also cons-
titutes a demanding challenge for the giudice per le indagini preliminari, 
who is normally kept in dark of the investigative strategy of the police 
and the prosecutorial authority. Indeed, though the code proclaims that 
incidente probatorio is governed by the same rules applicable to the trial 
evidence-gathering, it is difficult to imagine how a judge unaware of the 
prosecutorial strategy can truly check the exhaustiveness of questioning 
of witnesses or co-accused, and therefore, the need for additional ques-
tions, as allowed in all trial hearings.70 
Moreover, it is questionable whether this procedure allows for 
private parties to have a fair opportunity to be involved in the gathering 
of incriminating evidence. Again, notwithstanding the formal extension of 
the rules applicable to the trial evidence-gathering, there are considerable 
differences from the way evidence is collected in open court. The main 
point of difference concerns the lack of information on the results of the 
69 Art. 391-bis et seqq. CCP.
70 Art. 506 CCP.
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prosecutorial and police investigations. Whereas at trial the parties are 
granted previous information on the oral evidence to be gathered, in the 
prosecutorial inquiry the defence normally has no access to the information 
obtained by the investigative bodies. The 1988 code did nothing to ensure 
information to the suspects involved in incidente probatorio. The problem 
arose a few years later, as the Constitutional Court pointed out the need for 
the public prosecutor to disclose previous statements given by the persons 
to be examined either at either the police or the prosecutor’s office no later 
than the day of the court hearing.71 It was clearly a compromise solution, 
which left almost no time to prepare effective defence. Italian legislature, 
however, intervened only in 1996,72 requiring disclosure from the prosecu-
tors at the latest two days before the oral hearing.73 Although this solution 
marked an important step forward, its scope of application was restricted 
solely to the case in which oral evidence was to be taken and even in this 
case, the defence could only access the previous statements of the person 
to be examined, which was a rather accidental situation. 
It is worth observing that these developments occurred in the 
aforementioned period of return to inquisitorial practices following the 
1992 legislation, which dropped some of the main innovations brought 
about by the 1988 code to avoid the unconditional use of out-of-court 
evidence. To compensate for the strengthening of hearsay evidence, both 
constitutional case-law and the legislature introduced some important 
innovations, which contributed to the enhancement of incidente proba-
torio. In 1994, the Constitutional Court extended the scope of incidente 
probatorio to the intermediate phase,74 which in turn altered the general 
dynamics of evidence-gathering in the pre-trial stages: thus, in the inter-
mediate phase, unlike in the pre-trial inquiry, the accused has full access 
to the prosecutorial file. Three years later, Italian legislature uncoupled 
an important case of incidente probatorio from reasons of urgency,75 
namely the hearing of co-defendants, no matter whether prosecuted in 
71 Constitutional Court, judgment 74/1991.
72 Law 267/1997.
73 Art. 398(3) CCP.
74 Constitutional Court, 77/1994.
75 Art. 392(1)(c-d) CCP, as reformed by the Law 267/1997.
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the same or other proceedings, provided, however, that they were to be 
questioned on issues concerned with other persons. This reform clearly 
attempted to contrast the increasing use of prosecutorial evidence at trial 
by strengthening the taking of information by means of a court procedure 
in camera during the pre-trial inquiry. This result was of the utmost im-
portance in the field of serious organised crimes, in which co-defendants 
can make a highly useful contribution to the ongoing investigation. Yet 
these developments confirmed the traditional tendency of Italian criminal 
justice to bring forward the fact-finding to the pre-trial phases. Since the 
1997 reform, the examination of co-defendants can ordinarily take place 
out of court, at request of prosecutors, regardless of whether concrete 
grounds exist that justify the collection of evidence at the pre-trial stage. 
Furthermore, the legislation issued in the midst of the 1990s did 
not only serve prosecutorial goals, but also marked a first important step 
in a process of in-depth changes in the structure of incidente probatorio, 
which ceased to be a tool (mainly) aimed at ensuring urgent evidence, 
becoming a mechanism of protection of the individuals involved in eviden-
ce-gathering. Remarkably, Law 66/1996 already enacted a new ground for 
incidente probatorio for the purposes of the examination of minors under 
16 years old in proceedings for sexual offences. This important reform 
strengthened the voice of vulnerable individuals, regardless of whether 
they were injured by the offence under investigation or had witnessed 
it,76 so much so that the competent judge for the preliminary inquiry was 
enabled to take particular measures to gather the testimony of minors, 
requiring them to be heard outside the courtroom (e.g. in their place of 
living). The most relevant changes, however, took place after the 1999 
fair trial constitutional reform, as the lawmakers amended most of the 
rules on the admission of out-of-court evidence by re-orienting them to 
the principle of contradictoire. Constitutional case-law strongly contribu-
ted to this evolution by declaring the regulation on incidente probatorio 
unconstitutional in that it did not account for cases involving vulnerable 
individuals, such as the victims of corruption77 and the mentally ill.78
76 Di Chiara. Incidente probatorio, p. 553.
77 Constitutional Court, judgment 262/1998.
78 Constitutional Court, judgment 63/2005.
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Another factor that has brought about functional changes in this 
special procedure was the increasing influence of international law, and 
particularly of international human rights case-law. It is noteworthy that 
in the same years in which the first developments occurred in the Italian 
law on the collection of pre-trial evidence, the Strasbourg Court made 
important steps toward the acknowledgment of a statute of victims and 
vulnerable witnesses.79 Over recent years, further legislative reforms, by 
way of domesticating important international and EU law instruments, 
have strengthened the ability of incidente probatorio to obtain evidence by 
vulnerable individuals. In 2013, the scope of this procedure was broade-
ned by Law 119/2013, which implemented the 2011 Council of Europe 
Convention of Istanbul on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence, launching a reform aimed at enhancing 
the criminal law protection of women also by means of procedural tools. 
the legislative reform on gender-based violence. The following year, Law 
24/2014, implementing the EU Directive on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims,80 extended the rules 
on pre-trial hearings to the judicial hearing of various vulnerable adults.81 
A further enhancement of this procedure in camera was achieved by Le-
gislative Decree 212/2015 implementing Directive 2012/29/EU on the 
victim’s rights in criminal proceedings, which not only enabled the judicial 
hearing of vulnerable victims but also extended to incidente probatorio 
some protective forms of hearing laid down for their trial examination.82 
To a great extent, these were positive results, which, enabling the 
examination of the aggrieved parties and vulnerable witnesses beyond ur-
gent cases and through protective means, protected them against the risks 
deriving from police and prosecutorial questionings while strengthening 
the suspect’s right to confrontation. However, these developments were 
not preceded by an in-depth reform of the general dynamics of incidente 
probatorio, which remained largely unchanged. As a consequence, the 
79 ECtHR, Doorson v. The Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1996, Appl. No. 
20524/92. 
80 Directive 2011/36/EU.
81 Art. 398(5-ter) CCP. 
82 Art. 398(5-quater) CCP.
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judicial hearing of victims and vulnerable witnesses is still subject to the 
request of either the public prosecutor or the defendant, since the victim 
is not yet entitled to apply for judicial intervention but can only ask the 
prosecutor to do so.83 Moreover, in spite of the legislative implementation 
of Directive 2012/13/EU, the defendant’s information rights are still 
weak in the pre-trial stage, with the result that, as a general rule, suspects 
are called upon to take part in the gathering of incriminating evidence 
through incidente probatorio without a proper knowledge of the results of 
the prosecutorial inquiries. It is true that in all the specific cases in which 
incidente probatorio aims at hearing vulnerable victims or witnesses, the 
prosecutorial office is required to disclose all the information gathered 
by the investigative authorities. However, the indiscriminate disclosure 
of prosecutorial evidence, while enhancing defence rights and the tasks 
of the judiciary, can also entail human rights problems. It is apparent 
that, if public prosecutors were required to disclose the information also 
in the case in which evidence is collected at the accused’s request,84 this 
might give rise to abuses and could largely frustrate the prosecutor’s 
investigative strategy. Moreover, that in these particular cases the com-
petent prosecutor must enable defendants to access the entire file of the 
pre-trial inquiry – and therefore also the evidence gathered in relation 
to other individuals – is certainly an excessive result, which can seve-
rely jeopardise the accused who is not affected by the sought evidence. 
Ultimately, it is questionable whether this solution, which was enacted 
by Law 66/1996 in relation to the examination of minors under 16 years 
old in proceedings for sexual offences, fits all the situations and the types 
of crimes listed in Article 392(1-bis) CCP.
4.4.  Pre-Trial resTricTions on freedom, ParTiciPaTory safeguards and The 
imParTialiTy of The comPeTenT judge 
Doubtless, the level of knowledge of the information gathered 
by the investigative authorities and the effectiveness of participatory 
safeguards constitute essential conditions of the proper fulfilment of the 
83 Art. 394 CCP. 
84 On this problem see Bargis. Commento all’art. 13 legge 66/1996, p. 504.
583
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 4, n. 2, p. 559-603, mai.-ago. 2018.
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v4i2.161 |
constitutional-law requirements of contradictoire and equality of arms 
before an impartial judge where interference with fundamental rights 
is at stake. In the field of pre-trial measures (misure cautelari), the pro-
ceedings regarding restrictions on freedom, in particular, provide clear 
examples of a rather formalistic view of a fair trial, which entails severe 
implications on both judicial fact-finding and defence rights of the indi-
viduals concerned. This result is mainly due to the overall structure of 
the proceedings aimed at the application of remand and further coercive 
measures, which, albeit with certain exceptions,85 still follow the tradi-
tional doctrine of inaudito reo decisions. As a consequence, individuals 
restricted in their most precious rights during the pre-trial inquiry (right 
to liberty, right to free movement, etc.) can only be heard after the judicial 
coercive order has been issued and, even worse, after the measure has 
been enforced. This judicial hearing aims at satisfying the fundamental 
right of the detained person to be brought before a judge, acknowledged 
by the European Convention86 and other international human rights char-
ters, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.87 
The dynamics of these proceedings are similar to those of penal order 
procedures, with the difference, however, that a short-distance judicial 
hearing of the accused must always take place after the execution of the 
coercive measure on pain of loss of its validity.88 
This mechanism raises two relevant questions from a human 
rights perspective, namely a) how the competent judge can impartially 
scrutinise the need for pre-trial coercion on the basis solely of the 
prosecutorial request and without hearing the defendant, and b) whe-
ther a subsequent judicial questioning suffices to ensure the accused 
a fair opportunity to be heard, while enabling the judicial authority to 
re-assess the justification of the measure applied in a fair and reliable 
85 In particular, the accused must be previously examined when a coercive mea-
sure is to be applied in the hearing aimed at validating arrest and when a new 
period of detention is needed after a previous pre-trial detention has expired 
because of the failure to bring the accused to the judicial authority. Cf. res-
pectively Arts. 294(1) and 302 CCP. 
86 Art. 5(3) ECHR.
87 Art. 9(3) ICCPR.
88 Art. 294(4) CCP.
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way. To be sure, unlike other European Constitutions,89 the 1947 Italian 
Constitution did not require the judicial authority to hear the individuals 
subject to pre-trial detention, not only prior to the judicial order but 
also afterwards. It might be argued that this significant lacuna impinged 
on the further developments that occurred in Italian criminal justice. 
The drafters of the 1988 code of criminal procedure, while introducing 
a new set of comprehensive rules on pre-trial measures, left to public 
prosecutors a wide margin of discretion in selecting the information 
supporting their requests, which therefore impinged on the level of 
knowledge of both the defendant and the competent judge. Moreover, 
the possibility of the prosecutor withholding relevant evidence also 
frustrated the goals of judicial hearing, while preventing the suspect 
from setting up a proper defence strategy. Worse still, under the original 
prosecutors could conduct the first questioning of defendants reman-
ded into custody or subject to further restrictions on freedom, and 
the lawyer’s presence even at the judicial hearing was not mandatory, 
with the result that suspects had to face alone the same authority that 
requested the coercive measure.  
This approach became inadequate already in the first years after 
the enactment of the new code. It took several years, however, before the 
legislature brought about some changes. The first important reform was 
carried out by Law 332/1995, which introduced two important innova-
tions with a view to enhancing participatory rights and the impartiality 
of the judiciary: a) it imposed on prosecutors the duty to attach to their 
request all the information collected in favour of the suspect and eventual 
defensive statements already lodged;90 and b) it banned prosecutorial ques-
tioning before the individuals concerned had been heard by the judicial 
89 For instance, the German Basic Law grants the individuals concerned the 
right to be informed of the grounds for arrest, a fundamental right that, 
moreover, entails the duty of the competent authority to hear them and 
allow them to raise objections and complaints against the arrest order. Cf. 
Art. 104(3) Basic Law. Remarkably, these guarantees also apply when the 
judicial authority orders pre-trial detention. This highlights that Germany 
enshrined at the constitutional level the right of detained individuals to ob-
tain an independent assessment of the lawfulness of detention on the basis 
of their allegations and claims. 
90 Art. 291(1) CCP.
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authority.91 Notwithstanding such positive achievements, this set-up was 
still largely unsatisfactory, mostly because of the weak defence safeguards 
both prior to decision-making and in the subsequent judicial hearing. Even 
after the 1995 reform, the decision on pre-trial measures was still issued 
inaudito reo. Moreover, it is clear that the notion of evidence ‘in favour of 
the defendant’ is by definition referential, which left to the prosecutorial 
authority much room for discretion in deciding what pieces of evidence 
must be attached to the request for a coercive measure.92 Depending on 
the decision made by the competent prosecutor, therefore, a considerable 
part of the prosecutorial and police investigations could be kept secret 
from the potential addressee of the sought measure. Most worryingly, the 
solution adopted enabled prosecutors to withhold relevant information also 
from the competent judge, who was not in a position to assess whether the 
prosecutorial decision to withhold information was justified by the need to 
avoid risks the ongoing inquiry and what implications it could have on the 
right to defence. In light of this, there was no independent oversight of the 
prosecutorial strategy and the protection of the right to information was 
entirely left to the unchallengeable decision of the competent prosecutor.
The negative repercussions of this set-up were magnified in the 
phase following the enforcement of coercive measures, mainly on two 
grounds. First, even after the 1995 reform, defendants were not to be given 
legal assistance in the subsequent judicial hearing. Second, withholding 
information from the defendant frustrated the possibility of challenging 
the lawfulness of coercive measures. In this regard, it should be noted that 
the Vassalli code provided for a special remedy against pre-trial detention 
and other restrictions on liberty, namely a judicial review (riesame) by a 
specialised court.93 The earlier case-law of the Supreme Court had ruled that 
this court could not annul the judicial order on the basis of evidence other 
than that attached by the prosecutor to the initial request or the information 
91 Art. 294(6) CCP. It should be taken into account, however, that prosecuto-
rial questionings were still allowed after provisional arrest and even in the 
hearing after the enforcement of remand detention, and the accused was not 
always assisted by a lawyer. See Constitutional Court, judgment 384/1996. 
92 Supreme Court, 2nd Section, decision of 18 March 2008, Capri, in CED 
239739. See Marzaduri. Commento all’art. 275, p. 179. 
93 Art. 309 CCP.
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produced in the judicial review proceedings.94 To be sure, the 1995 reform 
required prosecutors to disclose subsequent information in favour of de-
fendants, yet this requirement also had the same shortcomings of the new 
provision of Article 291(1) CCP. On close examination, the limitation of 
exculpatory evidence reflects an incorrect understanding of the right to 
a defence, which can be properly fulfilled if the defendant is ensured full 
knowledge of, and the possibility of contesting, incriminating evidence.
Subsequent legislation attempted to amend these deficiencies. 
The 2001 implementation of the constitutional fair trial reform enhan-
ced the right to a defence by requiring the assistance of a lawyer in the 
judicial hearing,95 thus making the questioning conducted without a 
counsel void. In recent years, moreover, Italian lawmakers carried out a 
number of important reforms in the field of pre-trial measures. A first 
opportunity was provided by the 2014 legislative implementation of 
the aforementioned EU Directive 2012/13. The following year, Italian 
legislature brought about significant changes in the rules on pre-trial 
coercive measures.96 It is worth observing, however, that despite these 
important innovations some of the shortcomings highlighted hitherto 
have unfortunately remained unchanged, and to a certain extent have 
been aggravated. Notwithstanding the enhancement of information 
rights to comply with the requirements set forth by EU law, the rather 
paternalistic logic introduced by the 1995 reform is still in force, and 
the recent reform on interception of telecommunication has worsened 
this legislative set-up. Thus, while public prosecutors, as a general rule, 
must attach to their request for coercive measures the records of ea-
vesdropping, a new provision enables them, “whenever necessary”, to 
attach solely the “essential extracts” of the intercepted conversations.97 
The obligation of disclosure only concerns exculpatory evidence, with 
all the limits deriving from the solution of 1995. Consequently, there is 
still a high risk that the ascertainment of the justification of the sought 
measure reflects the one-sided perspective of the prosecutorial authority.
94 Supreme Court, 1st Section, decision of 9 June 1995, Sanna, in CED 202460.
95 Art. 294(4) CCP.
96 Law 47/2015.
97 Art. 291(1-ter) CCP.
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Further human rights concerns arise in relation to subsequent 
judicial hearing. Notwithstanding the enhancement of legal assistance 
by the 2001 reform, it can be doubted that this guarantee can still en-
sure full compensation for the failure to involve the defendant prior to 
the application of pre-trial measures, and can therefore properly fulfil 
the requirements set by the European Convention. To start with, it is 
apparent that the effectiveness of legal assistance in the judicial hearing 
largely depends on the possibility of defendants communicating with 
their lawyer. During the pre-trial inquiry, however, prosecutors can 
request the competent judge to postpone the interview between the 
detained suspects and their lawyer.98 It is true that the prosecutorial 
request must be justified by specific and exceptional grounds, but these 
rather vague statutory indications can give rise to abuses. From this it 
follows that defendants may happen to meet with (or even be intro-
duced to) their lawyer only at the judicial hearing, which makes legal 
assistance, despite its mandatory nature, a purely formal guarantee. This 
situation is highly detrimental especially for defendants remanded into 
custody, who can remain up to five days without communication with 
their lawyer. Since this is the same time limit for the judicial authority 
to question them,99 defendants will inevitably loose any possibility 
of setting up a defensive strategy before the judicial hearing.100 The 
conditions for effective defence are further reduced when taking into 
account the fact that prosecutors can also request the moving forward 
of the remand hearing to within forty-eight hours from the enforcement 
of the coercive measure.101 If this result offers the advantage of moving 
forward the judicial guarantee, the postponement of the communications 
between the accused and his lawyer can have serious repercussions on 
the participatory rights and the right to freedom. 
98 Art. 104(3) CCP. It is noteworthy, however, that Law 103/2017 restricted the 
scope of this provision to a list of serious offences, laid down in Art. 51(3-bis 
& 3-quarter) CCP.
99 Art. 294(1) CCP. 
100 The negative effects of the postponement are reduced in case of house arrest, 
further coercive means and control measures, since the hearing must here 
take place within ten days. 
101 Art. 294(1-ter) CCP. 
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Doubtless, this set-up reveals the scant attention paid by Italian 
law to the defence’s contribution to the assessment of the lawfulness of 
coercive measures. A fair lawfulness test should require the fulfilment of 
specific qualitative conditions to enable the defendant to produce exculpa-
tory evidence and to contest the prosecutorial information that supported 
the judicial order. Yet Italian law still has considerable backwardness in 
this regard, and notwithstanding some recent steps forward, it is debatable 
whether the current legislative solutions properly fulfil the requirements 
set by EU law. Thus, Directive 2013/48/EU expressly grants defendants 
legal assistance “before they are questioned by the police or by another 
law enforcement or judicial authority”,102 while ensuring them the right to 
meet in private and communicate with the lawyer prior to questioning.103
Beyond the negative repercussions on the effectiveness of the 
right to a defence, it is clear that the degree of impartiality of the judicial 
authority also affects the fairness of the subsequent hearing. It is true 
that Italian courts rule out that the hearing conducted by a different 
judge is void.104 Nevertheless, the Vassalli code does not provide for 
any mechanism to prevent the defendant from being heard by the same 
judge who remanded him into custody or ordered another restriction on 
freedom against him on the basis of prosecutorial and police evidence. 
This makes it extremely difficult for the defence to obtain an impartial 
re-examination of the justification of the measure applied.
5.  the rIght to a defence and the prIncIple of equalIty of 
arms In the pre-trIal InquIry 
5.1. The consTiTuTional-law framework
A last problematic issue, from the viewpoint of the principle of 
equality of arms in the pre-trial phase, concerns the way in which the 
individuals involved in criminal proceedings (particularly, the suspect) 
102 Art. 3(2)(a) of Directive 2013/48/EU.
103 Art. 3(3)(a) of Directive 2013/48/EU.
104 Supreme Court, 3rd Section, decision of 4 December 2002, Caruso, in CED 
223737.
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can exercise their right to a defence during the prosecutorial inquiry. 
Certainly, the new constitutional framework resulting from the 1999 fair 
trial reform provided the basis for a further enhancement of the defence’s 
role and judicial oversight in evidence-gathering, beyond the possibility of 
taking part in the police and prosecutorial inquiries. The acknowledgment 
of the right of the accused to consent to the use of evidence taken out 
of court105 constitutes a clear example of this approach. Furthermore, it 
has been observed that the fundamental right to examine or have exa-
mined incriminating witnesses, recognised by the international human 
rights charters, was constitutionalised in a version that strengthens the 
need for confrontation “before the judge”.106 Of course, this expression 
cannot be interpreted in such rigid terms that confrontation could only 
take place before the trial judges, since this would inevitably entail the 
unlawfulness of any decision based on evidence gathered out of court. 
Two aspects, however, distinguish the approach of Italian constitutional 
law from that followed by the European Convention and further developed 
by Strasbourg case-law. First, the Italian Constitution does not deem any 
confrontation sufficient to fulfil the defendants’ right to contradictoire, 
instead requiring confrontation to take place, as a rule, in a court hearing 
with the direct involvement of the defence. Second, the constitutional-
-law arrangements exclude, as a matter of principle, confrontation being 
indirectly satisfied by means of questioning of incriminating witnesses 
by a judicial authority.107 Thus, the possibility of an investigative magis-
trate examining the accuser in favour of the defence does not seem to 
105 Art. 111(5) Const. On the relevance of consent of the parties in fact-finding 
see among others Di Bitonto. Profili dispositivi dell’accertamento penale. 
106 Art. 111(3) Const.
107 At first glance, the wording of Article 6(3)(d) ECHR reflects the alternative 
between self-defence and legal assistance, allowing for the examination of 
incriminating witnesses by the defence lawyer in the countries that do not 
enable defendants to cross-examine prosecutorial witnesses. On close exa-
mination, the drafters of the European Convention aimed at striking a com-
promise between two main forms of confrontation existent in the European 
countries, which broadly correspond to a form of cross-examination, typical 
of common-law countries, conducted by the parties and the continental tra-
dition of witness’s examination conducted by a third body (presiding judge 
of the tribunal, investigating magistrate, etc.). Cf. Trechsel. Human rights in 
criminal proceedings, p. 90. 
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be in line with the Italian Constitution, since judges cannot clearly hear 
people before themselves.  
Against this background, I shall focus on two main problems, 
which relate to a) legal assistance and the right to take part in the police 
and prosecutorial investigative activities, and b) the possibility of private 
parties charging their lawyers with the task of carrying out autonomous 
investigations in the interests of their clients in parallel with the prose-
cutor’s inquiry. 
5.2.  legal assisTance and The righT To be involved in The Police and 
ProsecuTorial inquiries
Concerning the first issue, we saw that, in spite of its adversarial 
inspiration, the drafters of the 1988 codification maintained some im-
portant decision-making and coercive powers on the part of prosecutors 
as representatives of the judiciary, and to a certain extent enhanced the 
pre-trial inquiry in comparison to the Rocco code. To compensate for this 
approach, the Vassalli code, inheriting some of the solutions elaborated 
by constitutional case-law that had softened the strongly inquisitorial 
characteristics of the old istruzione, provided for various forms of in-
volvement of suspects (and to a certain extent of the victim as well) in 
police and prosecutorial inquiries. Legal scholarship used to define them 
in terms of ‘imperfect contradictoire’,108 which can in turn have different 
features depending on the degree of participation. Yet, despite the clear 
attempt to enhance participatory rights in the pre-trial inquiry, it can be 
doubted whether this approach truly grants the individuals concerned 
a fair opportunity to be involved in the police and prosecutorial inves-
tigations. It is apparent that the absence of an impartial body and the 
dominant role of the investigative authorities cannot satisfy the cons-
titutional requirements of fair evidence-gathering, based the principle 
of equality of arms. As long as prosecutors lead their investigations, the 
involvement of the defence will inevitably be secondary. 
This is apparent in case of questioning by the investigative au-
thorities. Clearly, the effectiveness of legal assistance largely depends on 
108 Cordero. Procedura penale, p. 891. 
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whether and to what extent lawyers can actively participate in the hearing. 
In the case of police questionings, the lawyer can only be present.109 In 
the interrogation by the prosecutor or by the police upon delegation, 
the defence lawyer can instead make specific requests and observations 
to the competent authority.110 Notwithstanding this more active role, 
however, there is no formal means to avoid inadequate questioning for 
the suspect. To a certain extent, moreover, the assistance of a lawyer can 
rebound like a boomerang, since the statements rendered by suspects to 
the public prosecutor or the police upon delegation, if inconsistent with 
the evidence rendered in open court, can be read out at trial and used as 
incriminating evidence against them.111 Worse still, out-court-statements 
of defendants can be admitted at trial if they either do not consent to the 
trial examination or are not present in court.112 Yet, there are considerable 
differences between these two situations. Whereas the former reflects 
a clear defensive choice, the latter is a neutral situation, which neither 
expresses the accused’s decision to waive his right to take part in crimi-
nal proceedings nor can per se make the out-of-court statements more 
reliable. In 2014, an important legislative reform – issued for the main 
purposes of aligning Italian legislation with the requirements set by EU 
law and particularly by Strasbourg case-law – abolished the old default 
proceedings (processo in contumacia), while allowing for the institution 
of proceedings in absentia under new conditions. Since these conditions 
do not still necessarily presuppose the accused’s knowledge of the court 
proceedings, the possibility of using against absent defendants the state-
ments given to the investigative authorities in the pre-trial phase raises 
serious human rights concerns, as it largely frustrates the general free-
dom of the accused to decide whether or not to be questioned at trial.113
The most elaborate form of involvement of private parties in 
prosecutorial inquiries in the pre-trial phase concerns the surveys con-
ducted by technical advisors appointed by the prosecutor. In urgent cases, 
109 Art. 350(3) CCP.
110 Art. 364(7) CCP.
111 Art. 503(5) CCP.
112 Art. 513(1) CCP.
113 Art. 503(1) CCP.
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prosecutors must follow a special procedure, which allows for the suspect 
not only to involve his lawyer but also to appoint a technical advisor of 
his own choosing.114 Even though technical and legal assistance allows for 
the individuals concerned to actively participate in the appointment of 
the technical investigation, the conducting of this survey, however, still 
remains in the hands of the public prosecutor without any intervention of 
an independent authority. Here also, moreover, the (potential) involve-
ment of private parties can backfire, as the results of the technical survey 
conducted by the prosecutor’s advisor will be included into the trial file 
as ‘non-repeatable evidence’, regardless of whether or not private parties 
had a fair opportunity to contribute to the prosecutorial investigation.115
In specific cases, Italian law recognises to individuals other than 
the suspect some participatory safeguards in the police and prosecutorial 
investigations. The rules on non-repeatable technical surveys conducted 
by prosecutor’s advisors, for example, extend to the victim the same gua-
rantees acknowledged to the suspect.116 A number of legislative reforms 
issued over more than twenty-five years has strengthened defence rights 
of some types of informants in particular cases of police or prosecutorial 
questioning in the pre-trial inquiry. Yet these reforms reflected a one-si-
ded view of questioning, which does not take into due account the need 
for complex balance among conflicting interests in light of an overall 
understanding of criminal proceedings. 
A clear example is provided by questioning of co-defendants. 
The 1992 antimafia legislation also empowered the police to question 
co-defendants at their own initiative, co-defendants who, unlike other 
informants, had to be assisted by a lawyer.117 It was an investigative power 
of no little importance, taking into account the relevance, especially for the 
purposes of proceedings regarding mafia-type crimes, of the information 
given by persons available for collaboration with the authorities. Almost 
ten years later, Law 63/2001 introduced an unprecedented form of witness 
testimony for co-defendants assisted by a lawyer (testimonianza assistita), 
114 Art. 360 CCP.
115 See Article 360(5) in conjunction with Article 431 CCP. 
116 Art. 360(1) CCP.
117 Art. 351(1-bis) CCP.
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reserved to the individuals prosecuted in same or in other proceedings 
who consent to give evidence against other persons.118 Remarkably, this 
testimony also was not limited to the trial inquiry, as the same legislation 
enabled both the police and prosecutors to question co-defendants pur-
suant to the new rules.119 This co-defendant’s witness testimony enables a 
change of procedural status, which entails relevant consequences for the 
person examined. In particular, if the co-accused is ensured a full right to 
silence in normal cases, the scope of this right is generally restricted to the 
privilege against self-incrimination if he is available to give evidence on 
issues concerned with other people. Moreover, legal assistance can turn 
out to be a purely formal guarantee, since co-defendants are called upon 
to decide whether to give evidence on issues not exclusively concerned 
with their position without receiving clear information on the addressee 
of their statements. Worse still, the co-accused does not know in advance 
which questions the investigative authorities will put them. De lege ferenda, 
co-defendants should be properly informed before deciding whether to 
take on the role of special witnesses under Article 197-bis CCP. In other 
words, the different procedural status should be the consequence of the 
informed decision to answer questions directly concerned with other indi-
viduals, and to properly ensure this result, co-defendants, a good solution 
would be to allow for waiver of the right to silence only before a judge.120 
More recently, Italian legislature strengthened participatory rights 
of other individuals in case of police and prosecutorial questioning – in 
particular, minors, either as victims or witnesses of certain serious crimes, 
as well as vulnerable witnesses. In 2012, a legislative reform, implemen-
ting the Lanzarote Convention on Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, required prosecutors, while questioning 
minors (regardless of whether witnesses or victims) in case of particular 
serious crimes, to provide the assistance of an expert of child psycholo-
gy or psychiatry.121 The aforementioned 2013 reform on gender-based 
118 Art. 197-bis CCP. On this topic see among others Conti. L’imputato nel proce-
dimento connesso.
119 See respectively Arts. 351(1) and 362(1) CCP.
120 In this sense cf. Tonini. Riforma del sistema probatorio, p. 272.
121 Art. 362(1-bis) CCP, introduced by the Law 172/2012.
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violence later extended this requirement to the police questioning of 
minors.122 Finally, the 2015 legislative implementation of the EU Directive 
on victim’s rights in criminal proceedings recognised the same safeguards 
to the victims (even adults) in case of particular vulnerability.
Notwithstanding these positive results, it is questionable whe-
ther Italian law properly meets the standards of protection set forth 
by international and particularly EU law, which requires Member 
States to provide vulnerable victims not only with specialist support 
but also with legal assistance.123 Unlike co-defendants, the aggrieved 
party has still no right to legal assistance if questioned by the police 
or the prosecutor, nor is legal assistance ensured to the minors ques-
tioned in cases of sexual crimes and other serious offences. A further 
shortcoming of this regulation, which can also be observed in relation 
to co-defendants, is the failure of Italian lawmakers to take into due 
account the accused’s right to confrontation. Thus, all these reforms, 
despite enhancing participatory rights of the person examined, largely 
overlooked the problem of fulfilling the right of the addressee of in-
criminating evidence to be confronted with the accuser. Even in case 
of questioning of the co-accused examined as witnesses pursuant to 
Article 197-bis CCP, neither the police nor the prosecutor need sum-
mon the addressees of the co-accused’s statements or their counsel.124 
The need to avoid contacts with the suspect was expressly required 
in relation to the hearing of vulnerable witnesses.125 Yet, this solution 
cannot always be justified in all the types of police or prosecutorial 
questioning. Taking into consideration that the evidence rendered 
by minors or vulnerable witnesses can later be read out at trial, and 
under certain conditions can also be used against the accused, a better 
solution could be to require the investigative authority to set specific 
technological arrangements with a view to balancing the suspect’s 
right to confrontation with the need to avoid negative consequences 
on the person examined.  
122 Art. 351(1-ter) CCP.
123 Recital no. 38 of Directive 2012/29/EU.
124 Tonini. Riforma del sistema probatorio, p. 272. 
125 Art. 351(1-ter) CCP.
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5.3. The righT To carry ouT auTonomous defence invesTigaTions
Notwithstanding the relevance attached to the principle of con-
tradictoire, the 1988 code did not provide specific rules on the possibility 
of the lawyers of private parties carrying out autonomous investigations 
in parallel with the prosecutorial inquiry. Yet defence investigations have 
always existed. On close examination, this legislative set-up was no coinci-
dence, but reflected the aforementioned choice of lawmakers to maintain 
the dominant role in the preliminary phase of the prosecutorial office, as an 
independent body of justice. Consequently, not only was the new competent 
judge for the pre-trial inquiry called upon to intervene only for specific 
procedural purposes and with a limited knowledge of the prosecutorial 
strategy, but furthermore defence lawyers could either conduct inquiries 
without a formal procedural status or request the public prosecutor to carry 
out specific investigations in the interests of their clients. Both alternatives 
were clearly unsatisfactory and negatively affected the equality of arms in 
the pre-trial stages. Thus, while the informal character of defence investi-
gations impinged on the admissibility at trial of the evidence collected by 
counsels, the possibility of the investigative authorities conducting inquiries 
at the request of lawyers was subject to the prosecutor’s discretion.  
It was only Law 335/1995 that for the first time dealt with the 
problem of introducing a statute on defence investigations, but the inno-
vations brought about by this reform were rather minimal. It took other 
five years before Italian legislature intervened again. Yet, the expectations 
of a proper fulfilment of the constitutional fair trial reform were largely 
frustrated. Whereas the admissibility of out-of-court evidence was consi-
derably reduced, we have observed that several decision-making powers 
of the public prosecutor were maintained, and the role of the competent 
judge for procedural safeguards remained weak in the pre-trial inquiry. 
Italian lawmakers, therefore, walked a different road. It is noteworthy that 
one year before the implementation of the 1999 constitutional reform by 
the aforementioned Law 63/2001, another important reform – namely, 
Law 397/2000 – introduced an unprecedented regulation on the defence’s 
investigations with a view to implementing the par condicio principle.126
126 On defence investigations see Siracusano. Investigazioni difensive, pp. 496 
ff. On close examination, although the heading of Law 63/2001 explicitly 
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This legislative reform brought about a number of important 
innovations. In particular, it enabled the lawyers of private parties – i.e., 
not only of the suspect, but also of the victim or the damaged party – 
to conduct specific formal investigations, such as the questioning of 
informants. By way of giving counsels formal investigative powers, Law 
397/2000 also dealt with the problem of admissibility and use of the 
information taken during private investigators and defence lawyers. To 
achieve this result, the reform introduced two relevant provisions: a) it 
allowed defence lawyers to have an official file set up at the office of the 
competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry,127 and b) it extended to the 
results of the lawyer’s investigations the rules governing the reading out 
and use at trial of the evidence gathered out of court by the police and the 
prosecutor,128 rules that Law 63/2001, as noted, later amended pursuant 
to the requirements set by the 1999 constitutional reform. 
This legislation, which is largely still in force, made several steps 
forward in the road towards the enhancement of defence’s investigations. 
Even so, however, it is more than doubtful that this set-up achieves an 
effective equality of arms in the prosecutorial inquiry. It would be mis-
leading to think that the recognition of formal investigative powers and 
the extension of the conditions of use of prosecutorial evidence to the 
information gathered by counsels could be enough to counterbalance 
the overwhelming role of the investigative authorities in the pre-trial 
phase. To a great extent, the imbalance between public prosecutors and 
the individuals involved in their preliminary inquiries is due to social and 
economic differences among the parties. Furthermore, the investigative 
authorities hold coercive powers, which defence lawyers of course can-
not use. For instance, not only potential witnesses but also defendants 
and co-accused can coercively be brought to the police station or the 
prosecutor’s office for the purpose of questioning. Defence lawyers lack 
similar powers, and if informants summoned to be examined refuse to 
related to the implementation of the 1999 constitutional reform, this re-
sult was therefore due to both these legislative instruments. For in-depth 
analysis of these two reforms cf. Nobili. Giusto processo e indagini difen-
sive, pp. 5 ff. 
127 Art. 391-octies CCP.
128 Art. 391-decies CCP
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appear or to answer specific questions, the only possibility is to request 
either questioning by the competent prosecutor or a judicial hearing by 
means of incidente probatorio.129 Therefore, giving a formal status to the 
investigations of defence lawyers could only reach a formal degree of par 
condicio. It might also be argued that the legislative attempt to compensate 
for the imbalance between the defence and the investigative authorities 
turned out to frustrate the principle of contradictoire, enhancing the 
possibility for both the prosecutor and private parties to gather evidence 
prior to the trial autonomously. 
Doubtless, another factor that considerably alters the trade-offs 
in the pre-trial inquiry is the different level of knowledge of the investi-
gations carried out by other parties. It is true that the defence’s investi-
gations do not necessarily follow the course of the prosecutorial inquiry 
as Law 397/2000 recognised the possibility of private parties charging 
their lawyers with the task of carrying out preventive investigations, 
i.e., with a view to the possible initiation of criminal proceedings.130 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that this possibility presupposes the suspect 
being aware of the initiation of the prosecutorial inquiry. In this regard, 
the 2014 legislative implementation of the EU Directive 2012/13 stren-
gthened the information rights in the pre-trial inquiry by enacting a new 
provision into the rules on a tool already existing, i.e., the notice of the 
investigation (informazione di garanzia), which aims at informing both 
suspects and victims of the ongoing prosecutorial inquiry. Pursuant to this 
new provision, prosecutors must inform both suspects and victims that 
they can obtain information about the annotation of notitia criminis.131 
However, since the rules on information on the charge have remained 
unchanged, it is doubtful that this innovation brought about positive 
results. Thus, information can still be denied in cases of serious offences 
and that prosecutors can withhold information on the charge without 
any judicial oversight. Furthermore, the 2014 Directive did not modify 
the general features of the notice of the investigation, which is only due 
where the investigative authorities decide to carry out investigations at 
129 Art. 391-bis(10-11) CCP.
130 Art. 391-nonies CCP.
131 Art. 369(1-bis) CCP.
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which the lawyer can be present.132 Therefore, the information safeguards 
of the individuals concerned – and as a consequence, the possibility 
of initiating defence investigations – largely depend on the strategy of 
prosecutors and the police.
To a certain extent, the different levels of information in the preli-
minary inquiry can also lead to unjustified imbalances in favour of private 
parties in the trial phase. This result is mostly due to the acknowledgment 
of the right to have an official file, which enables private parties to put 
exculpatory evidence at the disposal of the judicial authority without the 
need to forward it to the competent prosecutor or to request the investi-
gative bodies to carry out inquiries in their favour. The main difference 
with the prosecutor’s file is, however, that lawyers are not required to 
insert all the information available in their official file. This set-up can not 
only alter the trade-offs in the distribution of powers among the parties 
but also frustrate the tasks of trial judges, making it impossible for both 
the fact-finders to verify the information available to the defence at a 
certain stage of the proceedings. This issue is of the utmost importance 
for the purposes of the admission of out-of-court evidence that become 
unavailable at trial because of unpredictable circumstances.133 
An in-depth reflection on the potentials of the link among the 
equality of arms, the principle of contradictoire and the guarantee of judicial 
oversight should lead the Italian legislature to examine the advantages of 
alternative solutions. A proper solution might be to enhance jus postulandi 
of private parties, particularly in case of interference with fundamental 
rights. Thus, except in the case of access to private places or areas not 
open to the public that can be requested by a lawyer,134 Law 397/2000 
failed to amend the rules on other intrusive investigative measures, 
such as wiretaps, which can still be ordered solely upon request of the 
competent prosecutor. The main concern that prevented the legislature 
from reforming this set-up was the fear that acknowledging to private 
parties the right to request a judicial order authorising the use of coercive 
measures could lead to worse results than those of the old prosecutorial 
132 Art. 369(1) CCP.
133 Art. 512 CCP.
134 Art. 391-septies CCP.
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inquiry, while entailing the risk of misuse.135 Yet, this concern was pro-
bably excessive, taking into account that in Italian criminal justice, the 
judicial authority is always required to give reasons when interference 
with fundamental rights is necessary. 
concludIng remarks 
The analysis of the rules governing the prosecutorial inquiry dis-
plays a complex scenario, in which, despite the progressive enhancement 
of participatory safeguards of private parties, the overwhelming role of 
the investigative authorities does not set the necessary conditions for 
effective equality of arms among the parties, while largely frustrating 
the tasks of the judiciary. To a great extent, the maintenance of several 
decision-making and coercive powers of the public prosecutor still 
largely reflects the old conception of an independent body of justice, 
which is currently justified in light of the broad notion of judiciary 
under Italian law. Notwithstanding that the individuals involved in the 
prosecutorial inquiry – in particular, the suspect, as well as in specific 
contexts, the victim – are ensured participation in a number of police 
and prosecutorial investigations, legal assistance often lacks effecti-
veness. Furthermore, the possibility of defence lawyers conducting 
autonomous investigations, which has been acknowledged since 2000, 
has satisfied the fundamental requirement of par condicio only to a 
somewhat minimal extent. A number of relevant factors distinguish 
the defence investigations from the prosecutorial inquiry, which go 
far beyond the sphere of legal differences. In spite of the attempt to 
compensate for the dominant role of public prosecutors, the principle 
of contradictoire – the cornerstone of the Italian constitutional-law 
model of a fair trial – is therefore fulfilled in the pre-trial inquiry by 
means of separate investigations and evidence-gathering activities of 
the police and the prosecutor, on one side, and the private parties, on 
the other. Yet the absence of coercive powers of defence lawyers and 
especially the scant possibilities of requesting judicial intervention to 
135 Marzaduri. Commento all’art. 1 legge costituzionale 2/1999, p. 770. 
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have investigative measures ordered in the favour of the individuals 
concerned accentuate the difference with the investigative bodies. 
The imbalances among the parties, moreover, do not only ne-
gatively affect the principles of contradictoire and equality of arms, but 
in light of an overall view of the constitutional-law fair trial guarantees, 
also inevitably impinge on the effectiveness of the role of the judiciary. 
There can be little doubt that the weak defence rights in the police and 
prosecutorial inquiries, as well as the difficulties of lawyers in carrying 
out effective defence investigations, do not set the best conditions for 
a fair evidence-gathering with a view to the decisions that can be made 
during the prosecutorial phase. Although the use of intrusive investigations 
and coercive measures, in particular, calls for independent oversight, the 
judge’s assessment is often based only on the information collected by the 
investigative authorities, as suspects may not even know the existence of 
an ongoing prosecutorial investigation. The maintenance of a number of 
interim procedures aimed at a decision inaudito reo (remand proceedings, 
procedure on the use of eavesdropping devices, etc.) radically excludes the 
defence’s intervention prior to decision-making. Worse still, Italian law 
acknowledges to public prosecutors wide possibilities of hiding relevant 
information not only to the individuals concerned and their lawyers, but 
also to the competent judge, who is often therefore not in a position to 
rule in a truly impartial way. Certainly, this solution cannot be justified 
in a human rights-oriented model of criminal justice, and de lege ferenda, 
the enhancement of the tasks of competent judge for the pre-trial inquiry, 
who under Italian law is not an investigative magistrate but is called 
upon to ensure the proper fulfilment of procedural safeguards, appears 
to constitute today the best alternative to one-sided investigations and 
the dominant role of the investigative authorities.  
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